Exercises
Basic Instinct
Three
centuries ago, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz had a dream. The
German philosopher and mathematician believed that all rational
thinking could be described with a formula. He imagined that
by inventing an alphabet of human thought—a system of characters
for irreducible concepts—and then combining these in a calculus
of reasoning, mathematicians would be able to solve all scientific
and moral matters. He proclaimed that "a few selected persons
might be able to do the whole thing in five years".
Leibnitz's grand scheme may seem naive, even
ludicrous, but shades of it live on. From
philosophers to economists, many modern researchers believe
that rationality is objective and open to mathematical analysis.
In their studies of reasoning and models of markets, they
see rational decision-makers as supernatural beings with the
logic of a supercomputer, boundless knowledge and all eternity
in which to make a decision. Most of them readily accept that
this view is unrealistic but, they argue, if there were no
limits to our rationality we would be able to make the best
possible choices. We may not think in this way, but we should.
This view is now being challenged. In an attempt
to inject some realism into the study of rationality, Gerd
Gigerenzer and his team at the Max Planck Institute for Human
Development in Berlin are investigating the idea that evolution
has endowed us with a set of mental shortcuts—tools for
making quick decisions. Sure, the human mind can perform long-winded
calculations and amazing feats of memory, they say, but in
everyday situations we tend to use the shortcuts in our "adaptive
toolbox". Gigerenzer and his colleagues have not only identified
some of these mental shortcuts but also put them to the
test.It
may look like sloppy thinking when we jump to a conclusion
or follow a gut feeling, but our mental shortcuts turn out
to be astonishingly successful.
In
the real world, a good decision is less about finding the
best alternative than about finding one that works.
Herbert Simon of Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh
was one of the first to recognise this in the 1950s when he
coined the term "bounded rationality". He pointed out that
the way any animal thinks depends on its cognitive limitations
and the environment in which it lives. So a creature such
as a field mouse, whose food is randomly distributed, needn't
evolve complex foraging strategies, whereas one such as a
lion, whose food sources are indicated by clues in the environment,
will have an advantage if it can use sophisticated mental
abilities such as planning.
Simon's
ideas have become fashionable in recent years, and the Berlin
researchers are leading the renaissance. They point
out that our minds, like our bodies, have been shaped by evolution:
we have inherited ways of thinking from those of our ancestors
whose mental tools were best adapted for survival and reproduction.
No time then for careful calculations—a cogitating ancestor
would have risked losing dinner, a mate or even its life.
Instead, our mental tools are fast and frugal. They allow
us to make decisions based on very little information and
using simple rules. Each tool, or heuristic, is designed to
resolve a certain type of dilemma under certain circumstances.
"There is no general tool," says Gigerenzer. "Our simple rules
are problem-dependent."
Although they apply to different sorts of
problems, heuristics have a common structure, which arises
from the way humans make decisions. First, we search the environment
for information, or cues, upon which to base a choice. A heuristic
contains rules that direct the search. Next, we must stop
searching. It's pointless trying to find out everything there
is to know about a nut or berry if we starve in the process.
Heuristics contain a stopping rule, often ending the search
after only a few cures have been considered. Finally, we must
make the choice—eat, run, mate, attack. But all the survival
benefits of speed are lost if we make the wrong decision.
Perhaps the fastest and most frugal rule of
thumb is the Recognition heuristic. Peter Todd, an evolutionary
psychologist and cofounder of the research group, points out
that, given Dr Seuss's famous menu of green eggs and ham,
most people would opt for the ham. By choosing "the familiar"
as the only cue worth considering, you get your calories without
wasting time trying to discover whether green eggs are edible.
Brown rats follow the same strategy, preferring to eat foods
that they have smelt on the breath of other rats. But the
recognition heuristic doesn't work only with food. Imagine
you are a Stone Age man choosing a hunting party or a computer-age
woman looking for business partners.Chances
are you'll pick people you know, or have heard are good.
The benefits are obvious.
In many situations, simply choosing what you
recognise will work better than choosing at random. When Gigerenzer
and his colleague Daniel Goldstein showed volunteers pairs
of cities and asked them to identify the largest of each pair,
people tended to choose the city whose name they recognised.
When Americans were asked to distinguish between pairs of
German cities, this strategy gave a 73 per cent success rate.
Random guessing would have produced around 50 percent. What's
more, the success rate fell to 71 per cent when the Americans
were asked to do the same for cities in the US. This "more-is-less"
effect happens because the Recognition heuristic does not
work as well when you know too much. "There is wisdom in
ignorance,"
says Gigerenzer. Though many choices will not succumb to such
a simple approach, the researchers have identified several
other shortcuts that make a decision based on a single reason.
Heuristics called Minimalist and Take The Best, for example,
search through a sequence of cues until they find one that
distinguishes between the alternative courses of action. Minimalist
is perhaps the natural progression from the Recognition heuristic.
Forced to make a choice between two cities that you recognise
but know very little about, you might consider a cue such
as "Do the cities have an airport?" If only one does, then
you assume that it is the larger city. If both or neither
do then you consider another cue at random.
Take The Best, on the other hand, works well
in situations where experience leads us to believe that we
know which cues are most important. In choosing a mate, for
example, many animals (including humans) have distinct priorities.
Take The Best uses the cues in order of importance, stopping
the search as soon as one cue distinguishes between the possible
choices.
To see whether a single reason really can
form a good basis for making decision, Goldstein, working
with Max Planck researchers Jean Czerlinski and Laura Martignon
compared Minimalist and Take The Best with two conventional
analytical tools that use all available information—multiple
regression and a simplified regression known as Dawes's rule.
The researchers used all four algorithms to make predictions
in 20 test areas. These included the dropout rates in various
Chicago high schools, given such cues as ethnic composition
and class size, and the incomes of academics, given cues such
as gender, rank and years since graduation.
"The two fast and frugal heuristics always
came close to, and often exceeded, the performance of the
traditional algorithms," says Todd, "even though they only
looked through a third of the cues on average." One reason
for this success might be that in natural environments cues
tend to be linked, so an exhaustive search may not provide
much more useful information than a fast and frugal search.
In nature, one-reason heuristics seem to be
used by parents to decide which of their offspring to invest
in. Some birds, for example, always feed the largest chick
in the nest, while others chose the hungriest or feed chicks
at random. In Berlin, Todd and his colleague Jennifer Davis
used computer simulations to show which single reason works
best under various environmental conditions. They found that
when food is scarce, feeding the largest offspring gives parents
the greatest chance of getting their genes passed on. In times
of plenty, however, the more egalitarian approach of choosing
the hungriest or feeding at random is most successful. In
the wild, most bird species do seem to follow such behavior
patterns. Some, such as pied flycatchers and sparrow hawks,
even change tack as the availability of food changes.
Davis and Todd also point out that human parents
divide land between their children using similar reasoning.
In cultures where resources are scarce, the eldest son tends
to inherit the land, but where land is plentiful, it is divided
more fairly among all the children.
Such single-reason heuristics may be very
useful, but they do not work in every situation. Our adaptive
toolbox has more complex equipment. Humans, like many animals,
use body language to distinguish friend from foe. The way
people move can tell you about their intentions—whether
they want to fight, play or court, for example. "Some of the
most obvious cues for intention can be assessed at a
distance,"
says Todd. But it takes more than a one-reason heuristic to
decide which intention the motion cues are pointing to.
Todd and Philip Blythe, another member of
the Max Planck team, showed people virtual bugs on a computer
screen that were programmed to suggest various intentions
by exhibiting different cues—such as their speed and whether
they moved in a straight line or meandered—to test a heuristic
called Categorization By Elimination. This
uses a succession of cues to whittle away the alternatives
until only one remains. With just half the available
cues, Categorization By Elimination correctly predicted two-thirds
of the intentions—similar to the success rate of a trained
human observer.
This match between the performance of a real
person and a heuristic is common, and the researchers view
it as evidence that we do indeed think in this way. But mental
short cuts are not always the best option.The
team has found that people tend to use more calculated reasoning
when they can take their time, while heuristics come into
their own when people are forced to think on their feet.
Even so, heuristics work in a broad range
of situations. Not
only do they allow us to choose between alternative courses
of action, they also work when a choice doesn't come with
all the options up front. If you're looking for
a new frock, a new home or a new girlfriend you must search
for the options—the available frocks, houses and women—as well as the cues with which to distinguish between them.
How do you know when to stop looking and make a choice?
The answer is something that Simon calls
"satisficing"—perhaps best thought of as a cross between satisfying and
sufficing. He says that in these situations we set ourselves
aspiration levels—which may alter over time—and stop looking
only once these have been achieved. Todd and Geoffrey Miller
from University College London, have used computer modeling
to investigate Satisficing heuristics in mate selection. The
most successful strategy for individuals seems to be
to learn their own rank in the mating hierarchy by looking
at the quality of the partners who accept or reject them.
They aspire only to those potential partners who match or
exceed their assessment of themselves. Todd and Miller now
aim to test how well this model matches the way people really
search for partners.
But what about love? Our emotions, it turns
out, can help us to make decisions too. Romantic love acts
as a potent force, stopping the search for new partners. Love
also highlights the importance of some cues above others.
Indeed, all emotions seem to work in this way, so helping
us to make decisions that effect our survival. Fear, for example,
may narrow our options to just one: flight. Parental love
leads us to care for our children regardless of the personal
cost. And disgust keeps us from eating rotting food.
Survival and reproduction are the two cornerstones
of evolution. And as evolution has shaped our adaptive toolbox,
it is not surprising that it is chock-full of tools to solve
problems such as finding food, avoiding predators, finding
a mate and caring for offspring. You can imagine each tool
labeled with a different sort of choice in a different environment. Gigenrenzer and his team are only beginning to reveal spanners
and hammers, wrenches and saws.
What is clear, however, is that we are not
born with a full set of shiny tools just waiting to be used.
Instead, we seem to get a starter kit upon which to build,
adapting tools and adding new ones as we learn about the world
we live in. So, for example, different cultures conform to
different social norms. By learning the rules, priorities
and expectations of our culture, we may be able to take advantage
of generations of acquired wisdom without really understanding
why. We also learn that in some social situations unpredictability
can be an advantage—giving you the edge over a competitor,
for example. In such cases it is rational to be inconsistent,
and heuristics can be adapted to allow for that.
Open the lid of the adaptive toolbox and you
start to see that rationality is impulsive, emotional, flexible
and inconsistent. It's a long way from the idealised decision-maker.
As for a calculus of rational thought: dream on Leibnitz.
(2 239 words )
(From New Scientist, 4 September 1999
)
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